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these discourses are complexly intertwined with nostalgic reconstructions of the more recent socialist past, as the realm of the social has been eviscerated by neoliberal imperatives to "build" the economy. Rather than viewing nostalgia as poor history, we need to engage with it as a social practice that mobilizes various signs of the past (colonial and otherwise) in the context of contemporary struggles.
Reconstructing Urban Space
Zanzibar city has often been described as a classic colonial dual order. The older section, now named Mji Mkongwe (but known as Stone Town in English), took shape on a triangular peninsula connected to the main island by a small neck of land. Although part of this area was inhabited going back to the 12th century (Sheriff 1995a), most of the present-day city was built since the 1830s, when the capital of the Omani sultanate was transferred to Zanzibar by Seyyid Said bin Sultan. By the time the British assumed formal control in 1890, the urban core was well established as the ceremonial and commercial heart of the sultanate. Colonial officials called it "town proper" and tried to sharpen its distinctiveness as an elite space. Most wealthy Arabs, Indians, and Europeans resided there in substantial stone structures three and four stories high. Across a tidal creek lay Ng'ambo (the other side), an area deprived of municipal services during the colonial period where the majority population, mostly Africans of diverse origin, recent migrants, freed slaves, and the working class, resided in largely single-story wattle and daub dwellings." This made for an urban milieu that was broadly (if incompletely) structured by a series of ideological and material contrasts: "Arab" and "Indian" versus "African," stone structures versus mud huts, rich versus poor, and the "town proper" versus Ng'ambo as the other side of the tracks.
The colonial social and spatial order was decisively overturned by the revolution of January 1964, which occupied and reworked the old city under the sign of Africanization and socialism. Most of the former elite fled into exile, and their mansions and monumental structures were turned into public housing or centers of social services. As one political activist told me, "The houses themselves were just abandoned when their owners fled abroad and then later nationalized. And those ones, those are the ones that were then given to people, especially African folk" (interview with Issa Rashid Juma, June 29, 1995). Less privileged Zanzibaris from periurban and rural areas moved in to claim the city center. All land was nationalized; large plantations were broken up and redistributed to smallholders in three-acre plots. The state assumed control of business activity in the once-vigorous commercial sector, monopolizing the import-export trade. The old city, the space of the former elite, was not demolished but simply allowed to languish as a relic of an outmoded social form. In the meantime, it was imaginatively reoccupied: the cooking fires of peasants and hanging laundry took over the balconies of the Sultan's palace.
The revolution was animated by a distinctly authoritarian sense of political order. The sole party brooked little dissent, enforcing social discipline through its security apparatus and ten-house cell committees. Citizens were forbidden to trade, travel, or talk freely. Movement in and out of the islands was sharply restricted. Outside sources of information, imported commodities, and investment capital were nonexistent. The revolutionary government sought to legitimize its rule and mobilize popular opinion by delivering social services. Free health care and education were instituted, and the provision of "modern" housing became a key preoccupation.6 In rural areas and in Ng'ambo, considerable resources were diverted to construct modernist blocks of public housing under East German sponsorship in the late 1960s and 1970s.
By the time I first arrived in Zanzibar in 1984, the revolution was on shaky ground. The clove economy that had supported the revolutionary government had largely collapsed. Between 1976 and 1985, economic performance declined by a full 27 percent (Muhajir 1993:43) . Social spending was stagnant, unable to keep pace with a growing population. Housing shortages were becoming particularly acute. Basic goods were in short supply, and rationing for rice, flour, sugar, and clothing was a staple of daily life. A Zanzibari friend remembered a rain poncho I had given him that he wore until it fell apart, remarking on the privations of the period: "You couldn't even buy shoes. If you saw an acquaintance in the market with fancy shoes, you would say, look at those Adidas, look at those Pumas, and you would know that whoever had them had a friend in Europe or America sending them such things. Or even dungarees or a T-shirt, these were rare things; you couldn't obtain them at all" (interview with Salim Sheha Tumbo, May 10, 1995). Unable to supply the "goods" of life, the state faced increasing levels of discontent. In the streets, ujamaa socialism was widely seen as the source of economic and social stagnation not to mention urban collapse.7
With the push to create new blocks of flats, older buildings had received little maintenance; after 20 years, the urban core was in an advancing state of decay (see Figure 1) . Under the force of monsoon rains, the stone structures were crumbling; many were in a critical state, and some had already collapsed, killing residents or passers-by (LaNier et al. 1983 ). In light of budget constraints and housing shortages, the idea of shoring up the existing built fabric took on new urgency. The state had little option but to solicit external technical assistance, initially approaching UNESCO. A preliminary survey took note of a number of architecturally significant structures in the older section of the city. By listing these, the government hoped to gain recognition from the World Heritage List and funding for conservation. This application was eventually denied, but as a series of assessment and aid missions passed through in the ensuing years, the question of historic preservation began to predominate, pushing housing provision into the background.8 Stone Town was no longer simply a space for sociability or shelter for citizens. Prompted by transnational donors, the state increasingly saw the city as an asset to be deployed in rebuilding the economy. Transnational donors used In the early 1980s, a Chinese planning team singled out "Stone Town" as a "famous historic city" unique along the East African coast.9 The planners argued that the area was potentially an economic asset, a national resource that should be used for tourist development (Qian and the Chinese City Planning Team 1982). These ideas were later taken up and elaborated by Western conservationists, who endorsed privatization and tourism as strategies to "save" Mji Mkongwe. In 1983, a UN Habitat team issued the first conservation master plan for the city (LaNier et al. 1983) . A host of proposed projects and studies followed, with yet another full master plan in the early 1990s, sponsored this time by the Aga Khan Trust for Culture and its Historic Cities Support Program. These schemes were flawed in numerous ways-the formulation of a master plan cost well over a million dollars and took a decade to frame, but no funds were ever found to implement it. Following the neoliberal ethic of Western aid policy in the age of Reagan and Thatcher, conservationists argued that privatization was the only way to "save" the city. Without a market stimulus, they alleged, history and heritage had no future. The state should sell off its properties, stop subsidizing rents, and think of ways to attract external investors and market the city.
With a new president and the Third Stage (Awamu Tatu) of the revolution in the mid-1980s, the state embraced economic liberalization with a vengeance, relying on external investors and returning exiles from the Gulf States, India, and Europe to produce an upsurge in tourism, development, and commercial activity. The last decade has seen a boom of building and restoration throughout the city. As property values soared beyond the reach of most Zanzibaris, many were forced to relocate outside the city. Public buildings were privatized and converted into tourist facilities. Investors and wealthy exiles bought out poorer residents and transformed their dwellings into hotels or luxury homes. Urban development in this context has resulted in highly contained niches of wealth and comfort, pockets of privilege that have been walled off from the effects of public sector decline. As the city was being transformed around them, many Zanzibaris, especially public workers, teachers, small traders, and craftspeople, were increasingly left behind. Unable to break out of the local shilling economy (in which the minimum monthly wage in 1995 was $11), their low wages were inadequate to supply even the basic necessities of life. The unemployed, especially the young, faced an even more precarious struggle to gain a place in the city and survive. High inflation and unemployment, sharp rises in subsistence and housing costs, diminished municipal services, and the collapse of public hospitals and schools-all of these features are crucial components of the present in Zanzibar. Without comprehending these forces, we cannot hope to understand nostalgic reconstructions of the Zanzibari past.
The Geography of Remembrance (in the Wake of Revolution) Nostalgia (colonial or otherwise) does not flower in just any soil. Certain factors are necessary for its emergence. A sense of linear historical time is essential. If history ends in redemption or if history cycles around in eternal return, then nostalgia becomes redundant. The flow of time also must not only be irretrievable but tinged with loss. The present must be compared to other moments and marked as a moment of decline-as in the fall of empires, for example, or national eclipse, or a loss of power and position by a particular social group. Moreover, nostalgia requires an object world to seize on-buildings, fashion, images, and the ephemera of everyday life. A society premised on ruthlessly junking old or outmoded objects in favor of the latest technology is less likely to foster regret or longing for the past (Chase and Shaw 1989:2-4).
These general factors also operate in concert with a range of more specific historical forces. Fred Davis (1979:49) notes that nostalgia is a discourse sparked by transition and discontinuity. Rapid shifts fuel nostalgia, and as Elizabeth Wilson reminds us, "the massive changes that take place in cities induce this emotion to an intense degree" (1997:137). In Zanzibar, as throughout much of the former socialist world, citizens have witnessed the sudden and seemingly incomprehensible collapse of socialist polities, economies, and values. "Reconstruction" in Eastern Europe, as Svetlana Boym (2001) has argued, has provided a fertile ground for nostalgia to flourish. Things once deemed relatively stable and durable-the face of the built landscape, basic provisions of health and welfare, and the right to work-have seemingly evaporated into thin air, eroding like the value of local currencies (Berman 1982) . Moreover, throughout much of Africa one also finds a widespread and profound sense of foreboding, a perceived crisis in the fundamental conditions of social production and reproduction brought on by neoliberal policies and market orthodoxies. From Angola to Zanzibar, people are confronting the restructurings of global capital in terms of an economics of impossibility that renders daily life ever more precarious (Comaroff and Comaroff During my fieldwork in the mid-1990s, urban Zanzibaris frequently lamented the present state of the city. The colonial period in particular, and to a lesser extent the revolution,10 was portrayed in a highly idealized light, as a time when things worked, the law was the law, and a shilling went a long way. Although some acknowledged that the colonial state was strict or even harsh at times, at least it had rules, they argued, and through the effectiveness of its planning and management, the city was a clean and orderly space." Residents typically attributed the current disorder of the urban sphere to a failure of moral will: a general erosion in imani (faith or righteousness), the collapse of community, and the indifference or incompetence of postcolonial regimes. Selfishness and greed were alleged to be the source of urban problems rather than more structural or historical causes.
Not surprisingly, the idealized past invoked by informants was nowhere to be found in the colonial archives, which were filled instead with lamentations about dirty streets, disorder, and deterioration that bore striking resemblance to contemporary complaints.12 Colonial rule, far from creating the conditions for urban order, had sown bureaucratic and legal chaos in a series of failed plans that made the recent conservation versions look like modest boondoggles by way of comparison.13 Indeed, many of the sources of contemporary urban ills can be traced back to colonial malfeasance and incompetence (Bissell 1999 ). Can we then say that colonial nostalgia is just misguided history or willful misrecognition? Is it simply the result of false consciousness or fantasy? None of these characterizations seem very convincing insofar as they rest on a dubious epistemological divide between observer and observed: "we" (presumably Western, educated, and privileged) see history in the clear light of day, whereas "they" (the people without history, subalterns, and informants) indulge in myths or mysticism. This separation allocates a different status and rationality to ethnographers and their "subjects," suggesting they are fundamentally opposed. But anthropologists have long been motivated by the very nostalgic impulses we seek to decry in the field, and we must recognize how nostalgia has shaped anthropology as a discipline as well as Western modernity more broadly. At the very moment it begins to put its workshop in order, to forge its proper tools, to start ready for work on its appointed task, the material of its study melts away with hopeless rapidity. Just now, when the methods and aims of scientific field ethnology have taken shape, when men fully trained for the work have begun to travel into savage countries and study their inhabitants-these die away before our very eyes. .. .The hope of gaining a new vision of savage humanity through the labours of scientific specialists opens out like a mirage, vanishing almost as soon as perceived. [1950:xv] This tragic consciousness of change was critical in the development of anthropology as t form of scientific rationality premised on encountering and encompassing lifeworlds of authentic, aboriginal, and primitive experienceworlds that were seen as disappearing or dissolving in the face of the very forces of colonial modernity that made anthropology possible in the first place. At the heart of this dilemma we find a palpable and painful sense of loss. A powerful, if unacknowledged, nostalgia gave shape to anthropology in its salvage mode: a discipline seeking to rescue whole worlds from the ravages of time, to make sense of social forms fast fading away (Clifford 1986 (2000) has underscored the continuing squeamishness of scholars when confronted with love or affection as an animating spirit in research. We continue to see nostalgia condemned as sentimental, sloppy, too easy, and indulgent. As a false or fictitious history, the product of fantasy, nostalgia lacks a "proper" distance or objectivity. Moreover, it is typically represented as a reaction to a larger and more encompassing set of forces: modernity or modernization; consumption, spectacle, and the eclipse of history; postmodernism; transnational or late capitalism; and, of course, globalization. Not only does nostalgia appear in much of this literature as retrograde and reactionary, it is also represented as having a uniform and pervasive character, as something that suffuses or saturates an entire social field-and this undifferentiated approach to social discourse and practice seems especially problematic from an ethnographic perspective. Nostalgic expressions may indeed be retrograde or right wing in certain cases-but they are not by any means necessarily so or everywhere the same. If, as Nicholas Thomas (1994) suggests, we need to revise global theories of colonialism that do not allow for heterogeneity and difference, then we should do the same with colonial nostalgia: in other words, we must pay greater attention to the specific geographies and particular histories of discourses and practices organized around logics of longing and loss. We need to recognize more explicitly that nostalgia "is a cultural practice, not a given content; its forms, meanings and effects shift with the context-it depends on where the speaker stands in the landscape of the present" (Stewart 1988:227) . A reconsideration of nostalgia, its scope and significance, seems timely now on several counts. Anthropologists have grappled in recent decades with questions as to how the traditional strengths of the discipline, its core interests and methodologies, can be extended to embrace new areas and problematics-mass media and culture, transnational flows and forces, globalization, migration, and refugee movements. As Akhil Gupta and James Ferguson (1992) have pointed out, many of us find ourselves encountering fields in which space, identity, and culture no longer neatly coincide. Discursively and historically linked to estrangement, to being out of place and far from home, nostalgia would seem to be a key issue for a contemporary anthropology concerned with topics such as diaspora, displacement, and deterritorialization. The stakes here are more than merely academic: On the ground in Zanzibar as elsewhere, nostalgia provides a crucial means of coming to terms with the disparate ways that people experience and understand processes of dislocation in the midst of a "new phase of nostalgia-producing globalization" (Robertson 1990:53) .
Returning to the Field: Colonial Nostalgia, Collective Memory, and the Creation of "Stone Town"
Nostalgic reconstructions of the past were anything but uniform in Zanzibar, and the first task is to capture these many dimensions within a complicated and contested terrain. To gain critical purchase, nostalgic discourses imaginatively rework time and space, conjuring up the plenitude of the past as a means of measuring the present. But this has nothing to do with the return of the repressed-colonial nostalgia is not some perverse or masochistic desire for the restoration of colonialism by those who were once subject to it. Nostalgia, after all, involves the longing for something that cannot be restored, something dead and gone. It precisely marks the distance between the "then" and "now," firmly anchoring colonialism in a faroff horizon, a mythic and memorialized frame. Here as elsewhere, nostalgia speaks of aspiration without possibility, deploying sensibilities and values drawn from the past in the context of current struggles. In both theory and practice, we need to be attentive to the different registers and forms of social memory at play. "Memories," as John Gillis reminds us, "help us make sense of the world we live in; and 'memory work' is, like any other kind of physical or mental labor, embedded in complex class, gender and power relations that determine what is remembered (or forgotten), by whom, and for what end" (1994: 3).
In her recent work on West African memories of the slave trade, Rosalind Shaw characterizes discursive and practical memory as "two poles of a continuum that does not entail a zero-sum conception of particular cultural forms as located exclusively at one or another of these extremes" (2002:7-8). Something similar is at work in Zanzibar, where there is a quite contested interplay of diverse social memory practices. Distinctions here are crucial. Although nostalgia is fueled by a sense of modernity as rupture, hard-edged and historically discontinuous, collective remembrance typically emerges out of efforts to forge a shared (if illusory) sense of group identity, cohesion, and long-term continuities.15 These divergent forms of memory practice are not mutually inconsistent or even contradictory; indeed, in certain circumstances they can feed each other. In this regard, we can see how "memory work" is neither monolithic nor mystical. To Kerwin Klein, the rise of scholarly interest in memory is a product of an eclipse of critical and secular historical practice. Klein criticizes the "memory industry" as a "reactionformation," something that allows us to "have our essentialism and deconstruct it, too" (2000:144). But "memory talk" is not all the same, nor is it necessarily imbued with therapeutic and theological overtones as he suggests. Indeed, all along the spectrum in Zanzibar, these memory practices are being produced precisely through "critical" and "secular" struggles over social differences, sociopolitical transformation, and a rapidly changing political economy. Something more than the reenchantment of history is afoot.
Nostalgia in Zanzibar has flourished precisely at a moment when the state and outside conservationists have sought to remake Stone Town under market conditions. Indeed, the harsh realities of neoliberal restructuring have gone hand in hand with efforts to portray the city as the product of a shared culture, historically continuous and enshrined in collective memory. Here, nostalgic reconstructions of the past can best be understood as a disruptive commentary on such claims. Conservation programs arose in the context of pervasive economic decline and urban decay. To gain access to external funding, state officials had to reconstitute the city as a site worthy of transnational interest and donor support. This involved shaping the older section of the capital into a distinctive collective artifact ("Stone Town"), the cultural property of a collective subject, the "Zanzibari people." Early on in the process, the Chinese master planners formulated this emergent position quite succinctly: "The Stone Town is a famous historic city in East The local state sought to use conservation as a means of addressing quite diverse constituencies. By painting itself as a sovereign force seeking to protect and preserve the unique cultural heritage of the Zanzibari people, the regime could shore up its internal legitimacy while papering over a panoply of very real differences. At the same time, it could use conservation as a means of gaining direct access to external aid, circumventing the union government, and extending its reach and authority. In addition, Zanzibari authorities had to portray themselves as guardians of collective cultural property if they had any hope of gaining donor support and becoming the main conduit for aid and investment. If local officials were regarded as unrepresentative, particularistic, or partisan, external agencies would deny them access to cultural development funding. As time went on, the state increasingly singled out the older section of the city and represented it in reified terms. By treating the city as a historic asset that could serve as the basis for a new tourist economy, the Zanzibari government sought to leverage space and culture to transform Stone Town into a global attraction.
Collective remembrance, group identity, and reified culture also played a significant role in the practice of outside conservationists. Most were motivated by the essentially aesthetic and antiquarian impulses common in preservation and heritage campaigns. Animated precisely by the same nostalgic sensibilities that once gave shape to salvage or museum anthropology, they understood the past in terms of identifying significant monuments, reifying urban history, and severing the built fabric of the city from the social context that produced it. Consultants largely construed Stone Town as a zone of tradition, a survival from an earlier time that needed to be protected from what they identified as "ill-conceived modem developments"-building conversions, air conditioners, garish signs, and other innovations fostered to cater to the tourist market (Walls and Crispe 1991). Reified distinctions between tradition and modernity made it all too easy to overlook the fact that the "historic city" of Zanzibar was itself the product of the thoroughly modern forces of merchant capitalism and colonialism that had once sparked urban transformation, just as tourist redevelopment was doing now. As Stone Town was being transformed from a lived space to a phantasmic one, the colonial nostalgia of the developers was an instigating factor spurring countemostalgias among the Many of the tropes identified by Edward Said (1978) as defining orientalism flourished in the popular press. Indeed, as Said argued, the recursivity and endless repetition of orientalist images is one of the primary means by which they take on the guise of being "really real." Zanzibar was described as "ancient," "timeless," or "a step back in time" (Taylor 1999:1). Shadowy courtyards, secrets, and stolen glimpses came in for prominent mention. Oriental despotism and sensuality seemed not far distant: "In the streets one still finds men in flowing robes and women in veils. In tall, shuttered rooms overlooking the sea there are still the clan loyalties, the whispered plots, the Byzantine intrigues of the harem" (Stewart 1996:12). Multiple strands of orientalist discourse came together to create a narrative that was both gendered and insistently sexualized. Timothy Mitchell (1988) has discussed the way that European travelers in 19th-century Cairo were confounded by the city, unable to readily grasp its form or obtain a commanding point of view. Represented as an enigma, the urban milieu simultaneously frustrated and fascinated the gaze of (mostly male) outsiders. As with Zanzibar much later, the street layout was represented as a "maze" or "labyrinth," constructing the Orient as a space of secrets and hidden depths. The "pleasures" of sightseeing were infused with the furtive logic of the voyeur, drawing symbolic parallels between the city and its veiled women. As one writer described his arrival in Stone Town, "Through carved doorways you could catch brief glimpses of courtyards festooned with washing. Dark figures gathered around fires. Above, in the top stories of the houses, veiled women with kohl-darkened eyes stared down over latticed balustrades" (Dalrymple 1995:118) . With its intricate street pattern and secluded inner spaces, Mji Mkongwe was depicted as refusing to give up its secrets too easily. As with veiled women, the stone exteriors of structures were said to simultaneously attract and resist the gaze of outsiders, offering only occasional hints of what lay within. This fascination with interiority neatly intersected with the figure of the harem, linking the gaze to fantasies of penetration and possession (Alloula 1986 ). The atmosphere was "intoxicating," menacing, and enticing all at once:
It is the women of Zanzibar who make the greatest impression. Winding their silent way through these forbidding passageways in long black robes that cover them from head to toe, they present a picture that is straight out of 1001 Nights. Even the fashionable platform sandals that peek out from underneath their hems are not unlike those that might have been worn by Scheherezade herself. The effect-the enticing and faintly menacing labyrinth of decaying buildings, the smell of exotic spices, the unfamiliar sound of the Swahili language, the mysterious robed women, the feeling that at any moment you might come around a corner and be confronted by Ali Baba, or a slave trader, or a sultan, or a genie-was intoxicating. Zanzibar is one of those rare and elemental places, first glimpsed long ago in some fantastic, half-forgotten dream. But it was for real, and now we had found it at last. 
Locating Longing and Loss in Zanzibar
Conservation spawned a series of contradictions that could not be neatly contained. The state, for example, adopted strategies for development that effectively undercut its claim to serve as a guardian of local heritage. The city had to be saved, officials asserted, because of its cultural and social significance for indigenes; and yet in practice the only way to "restore" the city was to render old buildings profitable, displacing local residents and transforming everyday spaces into capital assets. Western consultants vowed that the state could serve all interestsmarketing the city to investors and "high class" tourists while simultaneously protecting indigenes. To achieve this balance would have been difficult under any circumstances, but in practice little effort was expended to help those who were displaced. Local residents, especially poor tenants who had been given low-cost housing in confiscated structures in Mji Mkongwe during the revolution and who were now confronting privatization with fixed incomes and few political connections, increasingly found themselves holding the short end of the stick.
For their part, outside consultants and conservationists were forced to confront a related conundrum of their own making. From the outset, they vigorously advocated privatization and open markets as the means to achieve urban regeneration. However, they failed to anticipate the wild capitalism that would result. Conservationists never fully thought through the implications of a truly "free" market--one in which new owners of old structures might feel free to ignore preservation guidelines and remake or destroy social or cultural monuments in the interest of maximizing private profit. The external planners advocated policies that ultimately came back to haunt them, as rampant development seemed to overwhelm restoration and economic renewal came at a cost: a crisis in the public sector precipitated by following neoliberal prescriptions to the letter. The revolutionary government had adopted economic liberalization to a startling degree, and its capacity to control urban affairs shrank dramatically as a direct result. As tourism grew tenfold in less than eight years, Zanzibaris with access to capital and external investors sought to capitalize on the boom with a vengeance.19 The government was almost wholly dependent on private capital and external donors for support; it had little capacity to regulate these forces, even if it had the will to do so.
State attempts to foster collective memory through conservation did strike a chord with some Zanzibaris. For instance, official claims to protect cultural patrimony intersected quite neatly with certain strands of Zanzibari nationalist belief about the uniqueness of coastal society and its inherent superiority over the mainland. Invoking the 19th century might bring the exotic and erotic into conjuncture for Western tourists, but for some Zanzibaris such images suggested quite a different picture: a time when Zanzibar was at the height of its power and prominence, a cosmopolitan center of commerce and culture that ruled over a far-flung empire. Elite Zanzibari collectors, aesthetes, and antiquarians similarly responded to the luster of bygone days, as did a few sympathizers with the ancien regime--partisans of the old order who saw Zanzibar as the pinnacle of an Arab-Persian civilization that had been tragically swept aside by a "rag-tag" African revolution.
However, both conservation efforts and the new capitalist economy were almost exclusively top-down affairs, from which many urban residents felt excluded. The divided nature of Zanzibar, the visions and spaces carved out for tourist consumption, as opposed to the daily experience of most local residents, correlated with a dual economy marked by the currency that one could command-U.S. dollars or Tanzanian shillings. Those Zanzibaris and outsiders who possessed dollarproducing assets could indeed turn a nifty profit-anything from well-placed shops to exclusive hotels or private islands with "romantic" bungalows going for $500 a night. However, the vast majority of Zanzibaris had little or no chance of gaining access to the stability of "hard" currency: they were locked within a stagnant local economy in which steady inflation was diminishing the purchasing power of their already low wages, making it increasingly difficult simply to get by.
Ultimately these disjunctures and divisions were mirrored in the physical geography of the city. Economic restructuring had produced benefits that were quite narrowly spread. Investment and rehabilitation worked in a highly targeted way, creating restored sites that generated significant profits for their owners while the rest of the city was left to decay. Worse yet, the boom took off while social services continued their steep decline. The "fruits of the revolution," as they were once called, were increasingly allowed to wither away. Private doctors opened specialized clinics, but few Zanzibaris could afford their services. Medicines abounded on the shelves of new pharmacies but at prices that placed them well beyond reach. At the public hospital, health care was still nominally free, but few drugs were available. To obtain an operation, patients had to supply their own sutures, surgical gloves, and other essentials. Education was nominally free, but schools In a caf6 near the seafront I chatted with Harun bin Nu'man, a distant relative of the old ruling family. "In the old days everything was much better," he said as he sipped mint tea. "The streets were so clean: at the crack of dawn the sweepers would be out, so that by the time you got up, everything would be sparkling. And the manners! The court set the tone, and everyone would try to keep up. Twice a day the old sultan used to ride through the town in his red Rolls-Royce, and everyone would salute. We had so much pomp and ceremony, and everyone was part of it. Now all that has gone. And as for the old palaces, the squatters who occupied them don't mend the windows, and they cook their food on the carved wooden surfaces. They are destroying our heritage." [1995:127] Although the old elites had been scattered by the revolution and were too few in number to play a decisive role in contemporary Stone Town, this sensibility is still expressed by Zanzibaris of advanced age looking back to the days of their youth. In Baghani, one of the older sections of town, I spoke over tea one day with the aged scion of an influential Arab clan. As the glow of the late afternoon sun filled the living room of the house his grandfather had built, he lingered over the names and places of his youth, most now long forgotten, sighed and shook his head: "Zanzibar was the paradise of East Africa," he repeated many times as we conversed, lamenting the demise of a city that had once been cosmopolitan sana (very cosmopolitan).20
However, these nostalgic reflections were in no way restricted to the elderly and the former elite. Fatuma, a woman who participated in the revolution, for example, was particularly indignant regarding recent incursions on public space. As we talked, she complained that some urban gardens were being taken over by private interests while others lay littered and dirty. Not so long before, she alleged, such things would have been unthinkable. She related an anecdote about the former president, who passed through Jamhuri (Republic) Gardens in the late 1980s and saw a new foundation being laid there. He asked an aide what was going on and was informed that the space had been sold to a private entrepreneur to start a food kiosk. "'That is impossible,' he angrily replied, 'this is a garden for the people to come to, not the property of one person.' The foundation was razed as a result," she said, and the gardens restored. "That is what used to happen in the past," she went on, "when things weren't ruled by greed and haphazard building." The eyes of this revolutionary positively lit up when she recalled the public spaces of her youth during the colonial period-Victoria Gardens with its ayahs and children in prams, where she went to play with her closest female friends (mashoga); the weekly concerts by the Sultan's Police Band in Forodhani Bandstand or in the park between the sea and the English Club. "It was a time when procedures existed, discipline was strong, the laws were followed, and people lived with a great deal of neighborliness," she concluded (interview with Fatuma Amina Idris, June 23, 1995).
As we can see with Fatuma's abrupt shift from one mode of nostalgia to another, these discourses were informed by a very complex and fluid sense of temporality, disrupting any simple binary relation between past and present. Both the revolutionary and colonial periods could be variously invoked as urban Zanzibaris gave voice to a diverse array of longings. As in Fatuma's case, historical oppositions between these periods could dissolve as an informant shifted easily back and forth between them, seeking to draw diverse points of contrast. In broad terms, colonialism was deployed as a figure to evoke images of economic bounty, the rule of law, a well-managed state, and a graciously maintained city. The revolution, by contrast, stood for stability, broad provisions of social welfare, discipline, and basic rights to housing, health, work, and wages. The revolution, although brief in duration (20 years vs. about 75 for colonial rule), was both closer in time and more accessible to popular memory. Yet in some sense it was harder to burnish this period with a positive glow. A far greater proportion of urban residents had directly experienced the revolution (or knew others who had), and in the early 1980s, it was widely glossed in popular discourse as a time of authoritarian politics, isolation, and economic decline. Committed revolutionaries and diehard members of the ruling party (albeit a minority) were more likely to embrace the revolution in an unqualified way, but ordinary residents of Mji Mkongwe by and large were much more disenchanted. Indeed, the experience of socialism as a time of stagnation, political constraint, and urban decay led many Zanzibaris to welcome liberalization with open arms. However, the unrestrained capitalism of the 1990s prompted a sudden reappraisal of the revolution in popular memory. Even some Zanzibaris who had been dispossessed by the revolution began to recast that time in a more positive light-as a period of difficulty and unfreedom, yes, but also of order, discipline, and state concern for watu wadogo (the little people) or wanyonge (the oppressed).
I was most struck by the upsurge of nostalgic desire among those born well after the revolution, those of African descent, people lacking in privilege or position: small traders, teachers or other public sector workers, and under-or unemployed youth. Initially, many urban Zanzibaris had high expectations for the "goods" that economic and political liberalization might bring, but these hopes, as time went on, went largely unrealized. Neoliberal policy, as elsewhere in Africa, had fostered an unrestrained capitalism in which the rich seemingly got richer and the poor were simply shut out. As a local journalist trenchantly observed, "Under the Ujamaa era everything depended on the generosity of the state. But with the dawn of free market economy, it is everybody for himself" (Kilimwiko 1995:3). In the streets the initials of the ruling revolutionary party, CCM, were widely said to stand for "Chakua Chako Mapema," an ethic for the age that can be translated as "get yours while you can." A building inspector I knew quietly commented one evening that he was on the verge of quitting. Dealing every day with the passions unleashed by the recent land grab had left him feeling burned out. Watching neighbors come to blows and families falling out, he did not know if he could take it longer: "The spirit of people has changed now; land is property" (interview with Masud Salum Mohamed, December 15, 1993). A day laborer who had built his house for 3,000 shillings in 1972 snorted bitterly when I naively asked if he could do the same today. "Where man [Wapi, bwana]?" he expostulated. "A single bag of cement will cost you 4,000 shillings"-slightly less than what he might earn in a week. You would need at least 400,000 to 500,000 shillings, he said, to even begin thinking about building a very modest place on the outskirts of town (interview with Mzee Mkondo, May 27, 1995).
In mid-1995, I was hanging out with some younger men at their baraza, which simultaneously designates a group, a forum for debate, and the site where regular discussion takes place. Evaluating the lack of progress in official conservation efforts, Said observed, "It is not easy to make the city return to how it was in the past." One of his companions, Hassan, readily agreed, emphasizing the contrast between then and now with a derisive quip: "The difference is huge. In the past there was faith, now there's cocaine" (Said Omari and Hassan Ali, collective interview with the baraza of Sheikh Khalidi, July 10, 1995). Throughout my fieldwork, the decline of public services was widely lamented-streets, schools, and health care. As a potentially significant site for articulating social critique and protest, nostalgia has the capacity to conjoin space and time, placing them in a state of creative tension arid mobilizing them for reciprocal comment and contrast. This is especially true in the context of the city. As Elizabeth Wilson observes, "To return to a city in which you used to live is--especially if the gap is a long one-to be made sharply aware of the passage of time, and the changing fabric of cities congeals that process of the passage of time in a way that is both concrete and somehow eerie or ghostly" (1997:128). We can grasp then why it is that nostalgia is crucially informed by spatial restructuring and vice versa-urban conservation in Zanzibar, war devastation in Angola, or reconstruction in Berlin and Prague. Nostalgia is also uniquely capable of bridging gaps and crossing boundaries between public and private spheres. In the nostalgic domain, the personal is inherently politicaland vice versa. Above all, sentiments of longing and loss can supply a critical framework that dynamically links intimate and individual domains to broader issues of political import, and it does so in ways that are not only meaningful to social actors but deeply moving to them as well. Andreas Huyssen has suggested that the proliferation of memory discourses and practices across the globe is connected to a historical shift-the eclipse, that is, of the structure of temporality once associated with high modernity: a faith in progress, development, and an ultimate telos of history. We turn to the past, he argues, precisely to secure what the future can no longer supply. "Slowing down rather than speeding up, expanding the nature of public debate, trying to heal the wounds inflicted in the past, nurturing and expanding livable space rather than destroying it for the sake of some future promise, securing 'quality time'-these seem to be unmet cultural needs in a globalizing world" ( 14. If nostalgia first designated a condition of acute homesickness, it later became intimately tied to the problem of melancholia, which Bryan Turner identifies as the "specific depression of intellectuals" (1987:147). Melancholy was seen as an outgrowth of selfawareness, an appropriate outlook for beings inclined to dwell on the passage of time, the fragility of things, the inevitability of decay, dissolution, and death (Turner 1994 ABSTRACT When contemporary Africans express nostalgia for the colonial past, how are we to make sense of such sentiments? Anthropologists have tended to ignore colonial nostalgia, reacting with dismissal or distaste. This article seeks to account for this avoidance, exploring nostalgia as a crucial source for anthropology and a constitutive feature of Western modernity. Nostalgic sentiments of loss and longing are shaped by specific cultural concerns and struggles; like other forms of memory practice, these desires must be engaged with in ethnographic terms and located within the changing contours of a contested social landscape. In urban Zanzibar, I argue that colonial nostalgia has emerged in a postrevolutionary context and is best understood as a diverse set of responses to neoliberal policies of urban restructuring. [cities, social memory, neoliberalism, nostalgia, Zanzibar]
